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The paper begins with a summary of Alberts and Hayes’s concept of edge organizations, 
noting its distinguishing features.  Limitations and shortcoming are identified.  The 
critique broadens to include a discussion of the limited perspective on organizations 
utilized, the neglect of attention to edge forms in nonmilitary settings, inattention to the 
relevance of the institutional environment within which the military operates, and the 
failure to consider the difficulties of inducing radical change in existing, entrenched 






 I am part of a team of researchers that is collaborating with a number of scholars 
affiliated with the Center for Edge Power, headquartered at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  Our project stems from an effort stimulated by the recent work of David S. 
Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command, Control in the Information 
Age (2003).   While a number of my colleagues are productively investigating one or 
another process or facet associated with these concepts and arguments, in this paper, I 
embrace a somewhat more critical posture.  It seems important to me that we place the 
“edge” perspective in the broader context of organizational studies, noting both its 
strengths and limitations.   
 After briefly describing and commenting on the concept of edge organizations, I 
raise a number of questions and concerns which I believe need to be addressed in order 
to render the approach more usable. 
 
Edge Organizations 
The Concept of Edge 
 Alberts and Hayes have produced a thought-provoking and valuable set of 
arguments regarding the limitations of “industrial age” organizations and the necessity, 
given current conditions, to consider new ways of organizing.  Since their primary 
interest is in reshaping military organizations, they understandably strongly emphasize 
the ways in which our world has changed in its security concerns since 9/11.  Given a 
world containing non-state enemy forces operating around the globe in clandestine 
networks, standing armies and fixed fortifications appear increasingly outdated and 
ineffective. 
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 Although they give insufficient attention to related changes in the world of civilian 
organizations, Alberts and Hayes do recognize that all organizations, not just the 
military, are confronted by new challenges that render older structures inadequate.     
 In parsing the concept of “edge” organization, it seems important to emphasize 
that Alberts and Hayes’s formulation emphasizes structural features at two levels: (1) 
that of the individual organization and (2) that of a “system” of collaborating 
organizations.  Each level is briefly reviewed: 
Edge Organizations 
 Distinguishing features. While no single, succinct definition of “edge” 
organization is provided, the authors discuss a series of characteristics among which, to 
my mind, the following are primary: 
• Distributed information 
The driving force behind the edge model is the dawning of the “information age” with its 
changing “economics of information” especially the rise of information processing 
enablers in the new forms of information and computer technologies (ICT).  Indeed, in 
one of the strongest sections of their volume, Alberts and Hayes detail improvements in 
reach, richness, and quality of interactions as ICT has moved from telephone, to 
broadcast, to electronic-mail, to “fully-networked” collaborative technologies (chap. 5).      
• Collective sensemaking 
To their credit, the authors do not equate “information” with understanding or knowledge 
(see also, Nissen, 2006).  They recognize that information must be interpreted and 
contextualized to be useful.  Moreover, they recognize that to do so adequately requires 
“a wide variety of expertise and perspectives (to understand, filter, and integrate the 
available information and knowledge)” (Albert & Hayes, 2002, 74).  A good deal of effort 
must be devoted to sense-making.   
• Distributed power 
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If information is widely distributed, then so must power be widely distributed. “Edge 
organizations are characterized by the widespread sharing of information and the 
predominance of peer-to-peer relationships. . . In an edge organization, virtually 
everyone is at the edge because they are empowered.” (p. 176)  Leadership becomes 
“situational”: who “takes charge” will vary by the characteristics of the situation and the 
individual (p. 184).  The degree of centralization of command and control (C2) functions 
varies by task (chap. 2).  
• Dynamic task allocation 
Rather than a rigid system of task assignment accompanied by intense specialization, 
edge organizations are marked by greater redundancy of training and broader skill-sets.   
• Shared understanding of command intent 
C2 continues to play a crucial role, but C2 are viewed as functions, the distribution of 
which varies over place and time. C2 responsibilities vary by situation and are 
dependent on the nature of the tasks to be performed. (p. 17)   
 The aim or purpose of all of the above features is to improve the response 
capabilities of the military, to promote agility, so that response options will be available 
to meet varying circumstances (chap. 6).  The arguments are fundamentally based on a 
contingency theoretic view of organizations (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 
1967).  
Collaborating Systems 
One level up, edge organizations must be able to fold themselves into varying 
combinations of collaborative systems, not only across functional departments within a 
single organization but across diverse types of organizations—e.g., various branches of 
the military (joint forces), “coalition elements, interagency partners, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations” (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 16).  
This capability, in turn, requires: 
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• A robustly networked force  
Collaborating units need to be richly connected to a communications network and 
utilizing common languages (or translations) and similar cognitive frames allowing 
shared sense making and interpretation.  To overcome information overload, 
participants utilize a “post and smart pull approach” in which participants have available 
all necessary information and know how to access it as required by the changing 
situation (p. 118). 
• Network-centric joint action 
Rather than relying on fixed and stable “platforms” to coordinate joint action, systems 
comprised of edge organizations generate shifing nodes in the network—“dynamic 
reconfigurable packs, swarms, or other organizations of highly specialized components 
that work together” as required (p. 169).   
 This brief summary of what I see as the central ideas and arguments does not of 
course do justice to a much more elaborated set of arguments by Alberts and Hayes as 
they set forth a new organizational model.  The existing relatively rigid and hierarchical 
model is seen as hopelessly outdated given (1) the new types of unpredictable, 
nonconventional challenges faced by today’s military and (2) the new kinds of 
information and computer technologies and capabilities available to support more 
flexible organizational forms.  In short, the argument is fueled by the combination of new 
types of demands and tasks to be performed as well as the availability of new 
technologically enabled capabilities. 
Concerns Raised by Edge Organizations Concepts and Arguments 
 Staying within the conceptual framework developed by Alberts and Hayes, I 
begin by briefly noting some limitations or concerns: 
• Every organization an edge organization?   The argument appears to be that 
every unit or component of the military needs to become more edge-like—that 
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is, develop these capabilities—even though the range of tasks and challenges 
faced by different units varies greatly.  Do all units need to edge-like or only a 
sub set that is confronting the new types of challenge?  
• Cognitive limits?  From Simon (1945) up to the present, organization theorists 
have recognized that an important function of organizations is to help to 
overcome the cognitive limits of each of their members.  They do this by 
subdivision of complex tasks, specialization of personnel, and designing 
communication and training systems to support informed decision making.  
Apart from the human limits of cognitive capacity and calculating skills, March 
(1988), among others has emphasized the extent to which time and attention are 
scarce resources and thus have large effects on decision making.  Given the 
continued existence of such limits, is the edge concept realistic?      
• Conflict?  No attention is given to the existence of conflict, across persons, 
organizational subunits, organizations, countries.  Power receives attention only 
as influence, the ability to make things happen (p. 166).  Power differences tied 
to differences in interests or objectives is not considered.  Shouldn’t the 
likelihood of conflicts among units be explicitly considered? 
• Security?  Particularly in a military context, the lack of attention to issues of 
security is surprising.  The highly sensitive nature of much of the information 
transmitted and associated differences among personnel in privilege or access 
is not discussed.  Much of the information that would better inform actors in 
changing situations is classified, and thereby, unavailable.  Is the edge model 
consistent with a high security environment? 
• Vulnerabilities?  Edge organizations are argued to have distinctive capabilities.  
Have they no inherent weaknesses?  Again, in a military context, the open and 
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free-floating nature of information exchange would appear to present serious 
security problems.  We learn about the purported strengths of edge 
organizations.  What are their distinctive vulnerabilities? 
Finally, and more generally, the use of the “edge” metaphor seems misleading.  In the 
early stages of the discussion, it appeared that those participants at the boundaries of 
their organizations—those in contact with relevant environmental changes—would 
become empowered based on their first-hand knowledge of the situation.  But later, we 
learn that: “In an edge organization, virtually everyone is at the edge because they are 
empowered” (p. 176).  In short, edge does not refer to edge in any conventional sense, 
but rather refers to a richly interlinked, empowered collection of mission-oriented actors.   
 
Broadening the Critique 
 Next, I want to wider the scope of my comments to discuss matters that I think 
are highly relevant to thinking about edge organizations, but which, at least in the book 
under discussion, are hardly mentioned or completely ignored.  I briefly discuss four 
types of issues: (1) lack of attention to human/social issues; (2) inadequate attention to 
nonmilitary organizations; (3) insufficient attention to the wider environment in which 
military organizations operate; and (4) lack of consideration of the problems associated 
with organizational change. 
Rational vs. Natural System Perspectives 
 As a long term student of organizations, I have examined the intellectual context 
within which the modern field of organizational studies came together.  The early history 
of the field, at the beginning of the 20th century, was dominated by engineers like 
Frederick W. Taylor (1911), who were concerned to improve the technical design of 
organizations beginning with the rationalization of individual worker’s tasks and moving 
up to higher levels of coordination, planning and control systems.  During the late 1930s 
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and 1940s, in reaction to these technocratic views, social psychologists and sociologists 
began to conduct studies in factories and offices, focusing attention on human problems 
such as motivation and morale and social factors such as informal organization, shared 
norms, and conflicts (e.g., Mayo, 1945; Homans, 1950).  Hence, at the time the field of 
organization studies began to coalesce as an academic specialty, during the 1950s, 
efforts were made to include both of these foundational elements, forming as it were a 
“cleft rock” (Scott 2004) to support the fledgling field.  As the discipline began to develop, 
these two emphasizes became institutionalized as a kind of dualism, one branch 
emphasizing a set of “rational system” elements—organizations as technical instruments 
designed to achieve specified objectives—and the other, a set of “natural system” 
elements—organizations as human and social systems concerned with their own 
survival (Gouldner 1959; Scott 2003). 
 The contemporary heirs of these two traditions are still with us.  Current rational 
system approaches include design and contingency theorists—the camp that includes 
Alberts and Hayes (see also, Burton and Obel, 2004)—transaction cost economists 
(e.g., Williamson 1985), and knowledge-based theorists (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995; Nissen, 2006). Currently active schools utilizing the natural system perspective 
include resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), population ecology (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1989); and institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
 The current relevance of all this is to underline the point that Power to the Edge 
rests within a rational system perspective that privileges technical problems and 
solutions and, as a consequence, severely neglects relevant natural system concepts 
and arguments.  Among the missing or barely mentioned features that must be taken 
into account in designing, operating, or researching edge organizations are:   
• Recruitment, composition of the work force 
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The types of information processing, multi-skilled, sense-making participants described 
seem remote from the kinds of under-skilled, under-educated military personnel currently 
being recruited. 
• Training  
When one thinks about the structure and emphasis of current training programs—e.g., 
boot camp—their focus on discipline, unquestioning obedience to orders, and strict 
adherence to routine seems to be at the far end of the training continuum from edge 
organization requirements 
• Incentives 
Current incentives reinforce obedience, keeping one’s head down, unquestioned 
compliance to rules and orders rather than taking initiative, acknowledging and 
correcting mistakes, or organization learning.     
• Culture  
Alberts and Hayes refer here and there to the importance of a supportive “culture”—one 
that encourages learning and fosters trust among shifting networks of players, but there 
is no detailed consideration of the nature of this culture or how to create it.  But clearly a 
different culture from the one that currently pervades military organizations is essential to 
the functioning of edge organizations.   
 Since more conventional means of C2—hierarchy, specialization, discipline—are 
to be jettisoned, it becomes all the more important to cultivate the “softer” forms of 
organizing people to meet changing demands.  Culture, trust, broadened training to 
support increased discretion and flexibility—these modes of control have been examined 
by a wide variety of social scientists (e.g., Kunda, 1992; Martin, 2002l Ouchi, 1981; Trice 
and Beyer, 1993; Schein, 1992).  The wider organization literature contains much 
work—and some wisdom—on all of these and related topics which pertain to the human 
and social elements of organizations.   
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The Relevance of Non-military Organizations 
 Alberts and Hayes do not begin to exploit the considerable organizational 
literature that currently exists on edge-like organizations, including studies of temporary 
teams and task forces, communities of practice, outsourcing, delayering, alliances, 
network forms, and virtual organizations (e.g., Brown and Duguid, 1991; Child 2005; 
DiMaggio, 200l; Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005).   Without question, the best examples of 
such networked organizations, and the best studies of the emergence of such forms 
exist outside the military context.  While they acknowledge that the problems examined 
are “not unique to the military domain” (p. 6), they devote surprisingly little attention to 
examples and studies of nonmilitary organizations. 
 In one brief sentence, Alberts and Hayes assert that “warfare is qualitatively 
different from the management of other human enterprises by virtue of its time criticality 
and the high cost of error” (p. 13).  I believe that many private organizations would 
dispute the first criterion, pointing out that in meeting changing market demands 
successfully, time is of the essence.  Similarly, with regard to the second, “high costs of 
error” exist for many types of enterprises, from rail, transportation, and shipping 
companies to energy providers and financial institutions.  The military is (somewhat) 
unique in its monopoly of violence, although even here, we witness the existence of 
increasing numbers of private security forces (Edelman and Suchman, 1999) and the 
use of private companies, such as Halliburton, to supplement military forces in combat 
zones.  In short, it seems to be ever more difficult to find criteria to clearly distinguish 
military from non-military sectors and functions.  All the more reason, then, to employ 
and exploit the full range of organizational experience and organizational research to 
examine factors affecting the success of edge-type forms. 
Neglect of Wider Environment 
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 In addition to the “rational-natural” distinction noted above, researchers have long 
attended to differences between a “closed” and “open” system approach to 
organizational structures and functioning (Scott 2003).  While Alberts and Hayes 
acknowledge the challenge to current military units from changing environmental 
conditions, they do not begin to exploit the full range of insights available from more 
open system perspectives, in particular institutional theory.        
   Institutional theorists remind us that organizations operate not simply in a 
technical, resource-scarce world, but also in a social and symbolic world in which 
organizations are crafted out of available schemas and scripts, invested with meaning, 
and must attend to wider systems of rules, norms, and widely-shared cultural beliefs 
(Scott 2001).  These institutional frameworks work to both constrain and to empower 
organizations.   The frameworks vary over time and space—across regions and 
countries. 
 First, in terms of constraints, there are serious restrictions imposed on the 
military by wider political structures, especially in liberal democracies, on where 
discretion can be exercised and who is held accountable.  Fleet-footed, free-wheeling 
“nodes” of shifting coalitions of actors, may not be able to response rapidly to developing 
crisis situations because of legal and political restrictions and safeguards.  Pentagon 
officials hauled before congressional hearings may not be sympathetic to actions taken 
in which they, as “responsible” oversight officers, have had no say.   The “chain-of-
command” is not so much about who makes the decision as about who is accountable 
for the decisions made.   Military systems in less democratic societies may be less 
accountable to civilian political leaders, but nevertheless higher echelons must attend to 
managing the balance between control and responsibility.     
 With respect to empowerment, there is no question that, as noted above, the 
vocabulary of legitimate conceivable organizational forms has been vastly extended 
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during the past few decades.  Many “new” organizations have shed the time-honored 
hierarchical forms for flatter, more egalitarian modes of operation.  In the for-profit world, 
competition has forced such changes on reluctant organizations.  In the military world, 
new kinds of enemies—nonconventional forces, networked cells, gorilla bands—
operating in new ways both compel nonconventional responses and provide new models 
for organizing from which we can learn.    
The Difficulties of Engendering Organizational Change 
 Mostly because of the efforts and insights associated with the population ecology 
perspective, organization theorists have learned two valuable lessons about 
organizational change.  First, we have learned that organizational change is costly, 
difficult, even dangerous for existing organizations attempting to adapt to new 
circumstances.  The same factors that contribute to the durability and reliability of 
organizations—trained and experienced workers, settled work routines, dedicated 
equipment, stable ties to suppliers and customers—prevent speedy change or rapid 
adaptation to a new environment.  It is for this reason that, second, radical, in contrast to 
incremental organization change, occurs most often not because of changes in existing 
organizations but through the creation of new types of organizations. (Hannan and 
Freeman 1989; Tushman and Anderson, 1986)    It was not GE or Westinghouse, 
established firms in the electronics industry that were able to capture and master the 
new semi-computer technologies, but a new collection of firms—Apple, Microsoft—
giving rise to a new industry (Saxenian, 1994)   
 Based on my understanding of organizational change, I would venture the 
prediction that the radical kinds of transformations envisioned for the military by Alberts 
and Hayes in their work on edge organizations are unlikely to ever be successfully 
adopted by existing military organizations.  It will require the creation of new kinds of 
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units supported by new kinds of training, personnel, and deployment systems, not simply 
new technologies.     
Concluding Comment 
 The overall tone of my paper is no doubt overly critical.  While I do see 
shortcomings and limitations in Alberts and Hayes work on edge organizations, I also 
see much merit in their effort to propose a new model of organizing for (at least some) 
military operations.  They deal thoughtfully with the implications of the new ICT 
capabilities and point out their implications for rethinking and designing supportive 
structural changes.  They push our understanding and discussion along in a positive 
direction. 
 My comments are not meant to undercut but rather to supplement and, hopefully, 
enlarge our discussion.  I believe that the edge model has limitations, which can be 
remedied.  In particular, more attention must be devoted to the human and social 
elements of edge organizations as well as to the wider social and cultural environments 
within which all organizations, including military, function.  And, we need to think through 
the difficulties of implementing radical change initiatives, developing an appropriate 
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